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In his new book Planning, Time and Self-governance: Essays in Practical 
Rationality Michael E. Bratman tries to answer the following questions: 
Why be a planning agent and what is the value of a planning theory of inten-
tion? In order to answer these questions, he develops a diachronic account of 
rationality with the notion of self-governance. In order to fully understand 
what this means we need to look briefl y at Bratman’s earlier work. Over the 
course of the last three decades, Bratman has developed his theory of ac-
tion and practical reasoning—a planning theory of intention. The planning 
theory of intention states the following. Human beings are planning agents. 
We have the ability to formulate and execute plans. Plans are types of in-
tentions that are focused on future action i.e. future oriented intentions. 
Our capacity to form and execute plans stems from two general needs that 
we have as human beings: the need for deliberation or practical reasoning 
and the need for coordination. Our ability to deliberate would be of minimal 
use to us if we were doing it only moments before the time of action. In order 
to use our deliberate capacities to its fullest we deliberate in advance i.e. 
we plan. The second need that we, as human beings have is a need for co-
ordination. We can distinguish between two types of coordination: personal 
coordination that we have with ourselves at different times (intrapersonal 
coordination) and coordination that we have with others (interpersonal co-
ordination). Because we are limited creatures, both in cognitive and mate-
rial recourses, we need, in order to achieve complex and temporally distant 
goals both types of coordination—intrapersonal and interpersonal. Plans 
are an essential part of human agency and practical reasoning. Our ability 
to make plans is something that separates us from animals (although not 
the only thing; others being our language capacity, refl ection, higher-order 
cognition). Plans, as forms of intention, have distinctive normative proper-
ties like commitment and nonreconsideration. When we formulate plans we 
usually, if no new evidence, information or reasons arise, stick to them and 
do not reconsider them. This is because it would be almost impossible for us 
to manage our own lives if we would deliberate about every moment of every 
day on every decision we make. For example, if I want to go to the theatre I 
will do it in the following manner. I deliberate weather I want to go, decide 
on it, form an intention and then execute the action of going to the theatre. 
When all this is done, I will not, usually, reconsider every step of the way 
between my house and the theatre weather I should go or not. I consider 
that matter settled (although subject to change if I receive new evidence, 
information or reasons). From this Bratman builds the normative side of his 
planning theory of intention. The normative side consists of rational pres-
sures that are put on the agent who identifi es herself as a planning agent. 
Those pressures are intention consistency and intention stability. They 
state that an agent, if she is a planning agent, has to have intentions that 
are not contradictory. She cannot, simultaneously, have intentions that are 
not co-possible. For instance, an agent cannot intent and not intend to go to 
the theatre tonight. Also, her intentions have to have some level of stabil-
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ity i.e. she cannot suddenly drop her future-directed intention without any 
reason whatsoever. Lastly, this pressure gives rise to the norms of practical 
rationality. The most important norm for Bratman’s theory of intention is 
means-end coherence. The norm, roughly states that an agent, if she in-
tends some end E and is aware of the necessary means to E which is M she 
is rationally required to intent to M. This simply means that we need to 
intend the necessary means (if we know them) for our desired ends (goals). 
This is, very briefl y, Bratman’s theory of intention which he has developed 
in the last three decades and which had profound infl uence in the fi elds of 
philosophy of instrumental rationality and philosophy of action.
Now we can return to the book at hand—Planning, Time and Self-gover-
nance: Essays in Practical Rationality. In this book, Bratman tries to answer 
the questions why to be a planning agent and what is the value of a plan-
ning theory of intention? With his planning theory of intention Bratman has 
presented an in-depth and infl uential way of thinking about practical rea-
soning, instrumental rationality and everyday decision making. Bratman’s 
model explains and offers normative structures for everything from simple 
everyday decisions like what to eat for lunch tomorrow, to choosing between 
different option regarding your carrier or planning your retirement years. 
But, according to some philosophers he has not answered the real question 
regarding rationality and action, that is why should we care about being a 
planning agent and what value does a planning theory of intention brings 
to our lives. The short answer, located in the title of the book, is self-gover-
nance. We all want, at least a certain amount of, coherence and stability in 
our own lives. Means-end coherence and stability of intention can certainly 
provide instrumental reasons for stability and coherence in our lives but it 
seems (according to Bratman’s critics and Bratman’s argumentation in this 
book) that we value governing our own lives noninstrumentally—and that 
value is self-governance. For the long answer to the questions why to be a 
planning agent and what is the value of a planning theory of intention we 
need to examine the book more closely.
Firstly, we shall take a look at the structure of the book i.e. how chapters 
align with one another, secondly we shall examine the content of all the 
chapters and lastly see how it all ties up together.
The book is comprised of a set of essays that can stand independently of 
each other. Each essay has a clear and precise line of argumentation that 
can stand on its own and serves as a point in the overall argumentation of 
the entire book. All of the essays, excluding the fi rst essay (introduction) 
and the last essay, were published as independent papers elsewhere. These 
essays serve as chapters in this book and their order is chronological (with 
some exceptions). Bratman’s argumentation in this book can be analyzed as 
having two parts with two small excursions.
In the fi rst part, Chapters 1–4 (roughly), Bratman establishes the prob-
lem at hand. The fi rst problem is, as I have mentioned at the beginning, 
why should someone be a planning agent or what is the value of a plan-
ning theory of intention. The second problem is a problem of instrumental 
rationality in general i.e. whether there is such a thing or can it be reduced 
to theoretical rationality. Bratman acknowledges that these are genuine 
problems for his planning theory of intention and that something needs to 
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be done. In these chapters he is also laying grounds for the latter argumen-
tation involving self-governance.
In the second part, Chapters 5–11 (roughly), Bratman proposes a brand 
new way of looking at his planning theory of intention and that is Self-
governance-Planning Agency. The idea is to put some value into the plan-
ning theory of intention and that value is self-governance. We, presumably, 
fi nd some value in governing our own lives in contrast to aimlessly going 
from one personal project to another not fi nishing any of them. Bratman is 
arguing, roughly, that in order to achieve what we value, and that is self-
governance, we need to commit ourselves to the normative aspects of his 
planning theory of intention; means-end coherence and intention stability. 
Now I will briefl y discuss the content of each of the chapters in the book. 
Bratman’s “Introduction” servers two main purposes. The fi rst one is 
to offer a summary of all the other chapters in the book and the second is 
to present the challenge. The challenge is presented by Joseph Raz and 
Niko Kolodney and states that the idea that planning norms are norms of 
rationality is a myth. The rest of the book is Brtaman’s response to that 
challenge.
In the second chapter “Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical” and the 
third chapter “Intention, Belief, and Instrumental Rationality” Bratman 
expands and explains the challenge presented to him. Bratman is claiming 
that all of his critics, or at least most of them, have one thing in common. 
They are reducing the requirements of practical rationality, like demands 
for consistency and coherence, to the requirements of theoretical rationality. 
He calls these authors cognitivists. Cognitivists are authors who claim that 
“practical rationality of one’s system of intentions is, at bottom, theoretical 
rationality of one’s associated beliefs” (19). There are at least three authors 
who can be classifi ed as cognitivists: Gilbert Harman, J. David Velleman 
and R. Jay Wallace. In these chapters Bratman engages with the criticism 
of Gilbert Harman and J. David Velleman more thoroughly. Harman’s basic 
idea, as Bratman calls it, is that when an agent intents some end E she is 
necessarily believing E. Bratman responds by arguing that sometimes we 
intent some end E and do not believe it—as in the case of forgetfulness. 
Velleman’s critique of Bratman’s work can be roughly summarized by the 
following question: “Why… should an agent be rationally obliged to arrange 
means of carrying out an intention, if he is agnostic about whether he will 
in fact carry it out?” (Velleman 2007: 205). This is an attack on Bratman’s 
core normative requirement of practical rationality—means-end coherence. 
Bratman’s response is that we are rationally obliged to the norm of means-
end coherence because this norm stems from practical values like cross-
temporal integrity, cross-temporal self-governance and sociality.
Chapter 4 “Intention, Practical rationality and Self-governance” is the 
core chapter of Bratman’s book. In it he defends his planning theory of in-
tention as an account of rationality and sets foundations for a diachronic 
account of rationality by introducing the notion of self-governance. Firstly, 
Bratman restates his norms of practical rationality, means-end coherence, 
and intention consistency, respectively. Then, he argues that we have a dis-
tinctive noninstrumental practical reason to oblige to these norms. That 
reason is cross-temporal self-governance. The concept of self-governance 
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is something that Bratman derives from the works of Harry Frankfurt. 
Frankfurt’s idea is that we need an account of what is it for an agent to 
identify with a certain thought or an attitude. In other words, what is it for 
a thought or an attitude to speak to an agent; which thought has agential 
authority for an agent. Frankfurt, and subsequently Bratman, states that 
the relevant question for our practical thought and action is for an agent 
to ask herself Where do I stand? with respect to my intentions, attitudes 
and desired ends. She does this via deliberation and refl ection. When she 
has found “the place to stand” on some practical issue she can govern in a 
particular domain, “for self-governance where you stand guides your rel-
evant thought and action” (97). Because, we as human beings, are planning 
agents, we have the reason to oblige to practical norms of rationality and 
that reason is self-governance.
In Chapter 5 “Agency, Time and Sociality” Bratman is introducing and 
reintroducing two ideas that will be relevant for his diachronic account of 
rationality. Those ideas are shared intentional activity or the ability to have 
we-intentions and self-governance at the time (synchronic) and self-gover-
nance over time (diachronic). He does not explore these ideas in substantial 
details in this chapter. 
In Chapter 6 “Time, Rationality and Self-governance” Bratman expands 
on his notions of synchronic and diachronic self-governance. Synchronic 
self-governance is simply an agent’s practical standpoint at the time i.e. 
“synchronic structures of attitudes that is suffi ciently unifi ed so as to consti-
tute where the agent stands at that time” (144). Synchronic self-governance 
is a necessary but not suffi cient condition for diachronic self-governance. In 
order to achieve diachronic self-governance several conditions need to be 
met. Those conditions are the diachronic notion of personal identity i.e. an 
agent needs to be the same person over certain period of time, psychological 
continuity of the agent’s mental states over time, semantic interconnected-
ness of the agent’s intentions and default stability of intention. Bratman 
argues that the agent’s intentions need to be meaningfully connected in the 
context of her practical standpoint. He is doing that because he wants to 
avoid examples like the agent having a coherent and consistent set of weird 
and physically impossible fantasies. The agent’s intentions need to be stable 
(in absence of supposed conclusive reasons for change) in order to persist 
over time. When these conditions are met we have a diachronic notion of 
self-governance. We can use this notion as a normative (noninstrumental) 
reason to conform to practical norms of rationality like means-end coher-
ence and stability of intention.
As I mentioned before, there are two excursions in the second part of 
the book; Chapter 7 “Temptation and the Agent’s Standpoint” and Chapter 
8 “The Interplay of Intention and Reason”. In Chapter 7, Bratman revisits 
one of the key issues of his planning theory of intention—the problem of 
temptation, which is, in short, a diachronic form of the “weakness of will” 
problem. In Chapter 8, Bratman engages in a discussion with David Gauth-
ier’s theory of deliberation and practical reasoning. Both of these chapters 
are excursions at least in two senses. Firstly, they tackle specifi c issues; 
the problem of temptation and David Gauthier’s theory of deliberation and 
practical reasoning. Secondly, these chapters make the chronology of the 
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book out of sync. That being said, the problems in these chapters are solved 
by the account of diachronic rationality using the notion of self-governance, 
so in some way they do fi t with the rest of the second part of the book.
Chapter 9, “Consistency and Coherence in Plan” is written somewhat 
in a form of a dialogue between Bratman and a fi ctional planning agent 
named Kate. In this “conversation” Kate is asking two questions: is there 
any reason for her to be a planning agent and can she sometimes be a plan-
ning agent and sometimes not be a planning agent depending on her cur-
rent preferences and whether it is advantageous for her at that particular 
time? Bratman’s answer to the fi rst question is that we should be planning 
agents because we should value governing our own lives. In other words, 
the reason to be planning agent is self-governance. The answer to the sec-
ond question is that an agent, in this case Kate, cannot actually choose to 
be planning agent. Not all agents are planning agents but those who are 
cannot simply cease to be planning agents at will because planning agency 
is embedded in their psychic economy.
In Chapter 10 “Rational Planning Agency” Bratman develops his full-
fl edged diachronic account of rationality. Building on his notion of dia-
chronic self-governance Bratman argues for diachronic plan rationality 
which consists of several normative constraints. Practical rationality/Self-
governance-Planning Agency states, roughly, that it is pro tanto, defeasibly 
irrational to fail to have a coherent practical plan-infused standpoint or 
to choose contrary to that standpoint. Diachronic Plan Rationality states, 
roughly, that when the conditions for synchronic and diachronic self-gov-
ernance are met it is defeasibly, pro tanto irrational to make choices that 
bock your continued diachronic self-governance. Rational end of diachronic 
self-governance states, roughly, that it is pro tanto, defeasibly irrational 
for a planning agent, capable of self-governance to fail to have an end of 
diachronic self-governance. These normative constraints (not exhaustively) 
constitute Bratman’s diachronic account of rationality.
In the last chapter of the book, Chapter 11 “A Planning Agent’s Self-
governance Over Time” Bratman explores the merger of his two ideas: the 
diachronic account of self-governance and intentional shared agency. The 
result is acting “together” with oneself at different times: a shared agency 
model of diachronic self-governance. In other words, the idea is that an 
agent “cooperates” with himself from different times in a way that different 
agents cooperate with each another. The idea is not new per se because it 
goes back to the days of decision theorists and game theorists like McClen-
nen, who argued that an agent is bargaining with himself from different 
times, but Bratman is revising the idea in a new light using the notion of 
diachronic self-governance.
Overall the book is very well structured and the argumentation is clear 
and precise. The chapters follow from one another nicely (with the possible 
exceptions of Chapters 7 and 8 which I have discussed). The book has two 
“fl aws”. The fi rst is that the book is not kind to the readers that are not 
familiar with contemporary issues in philosophy of action and instrumental 
rationality. The second is that some chapter focus on specifi c issues, like 
temptation, and do little to contribute to the general argumentation pre-
sented in the book. The project in the book is quite ambitious. Bratman is 
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presenting a new and fresh way of looking at practical rationality, norma-
tive reasons and philosophy of action. Whether his account of Diachronic 
Plan Rationality works or not is for the reader to decide.
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